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# Growth and Manipulation of Antinuclear Sentiment in East Asia: Consequences for US Forces

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A Research Paper

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# **Growth and Manipulation of Antinuclear Sentiment in East Asia: Consequences for US Forces**

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**A Research Paper**

This paper was prepared by the Office of East  
Asian Analysis, with contributions from the Office of  
Soviet Analysis and the Foreign Broadcast  
Information Service.

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**Growth and Manipulation  
of Antinuclear Sentiment  
in East Asia: Consequences  
for US Forces**

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**Summary**

*Information available  
as of 15 July 1986 was  
used in this report.*

A current of antinuclear sentiment exists throughout much of East Asia, but hotspots are largely confined to Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and the small island countries of the South Pacific. Opponents of nuclear weaponry and/or nuclear power are also active elsewhere in East Asia, but as yet their activities have brought them neither a strong public following nor influence over government policy.

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The Soviets, under General Secretary Gorbachev, are paying increased attention to East Asia and the Pacific and are working especially to fan antinuclear sentiments in order to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies. The Soviets, encouraged by antinuclear activism in East Asia, are espousing interlocking nuclear-free zones in the South Pacific, North Asia, and Southeast Asia, and are urging countries in the region to adopt policies that would diminish US influence and military presence in the Pacific.

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We believe antinuclear attitudes will remain strong in East Asia, especially in the South Pacific, and will complicate US defense arrangements and initiatives in the region. We expect the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty to be formally adopted later this year, and we believe that other Asian countries, including China and the Soviet Union, will support the treaty and agree to its protocols. We also expect the antinuclear policies of the Lange government in New Zealand to culminate in legislation that prohibits port calls by nuclear-powered or nuclear-capable warships. In addition:

- We believe that a few of the small South Pacific island states will follow New Zealand's lead and restrict the transit and port access of nuclear warships, but those states favorably inclined toward the United States and the Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty (ANZUS) will be reluctant to ban port calls because it would hurt ANZUS.
- The leaders of Australia's ruling Labor Party are committed to supporting ANZUS and should be able to hold the line on US ship visits and the use of strategically important joint facilities over the next year or two. If the leftist faction were to become the majority in the Labor Party, however, it could force the leaders to restrict ship visits and close the joint facilities.

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- We believe Japan will remain a steadfast ally firmly committed to the Mutual Security Treaty and to helping the United States maintain a strong defense posture in the western Pacific opposite the Soviet Union. We see little likelihood that antinuclear opposition parties will achieve the consensus to force the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to change its policies and restrict US military access to Japanese bases or ports.
- In our view, there is relatively little risk to US access to military bases in South Korea. We expect North Korea to continue its propaganda condemning the United States for deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea and urging southerners to demand their removal. Some radical South Korean students have echoed North Korea's anti-US and antinuclear themes, but few southerners support the extremists.
- We believe Chinese sensitivity to nuclear issues will restrict US and allied warship visits to Chinese ports, although the Chinese have agreed — after protracted negotiations — to a UK ship visit in July, and they continue to discuss with US officials the possibility of a US port call. In neighboring Hong Kong, the nascent antinuclear movement poses little immediate threat to US port calls, but Hong Kong's policy is likely to be more restrictive in 1997, when the Chinese assume responsibility for the territory's defense and foreign policy.
- We see relatively little danger to US interests from antinuclear movements in Southeast Asia. President Aquino has said she will hold a popular referendum on the US-Philippines agreement before it expires in 1991, and this could result in a public airing of the issues of nuclear warship basing and weapons storage in the Philippines. Aquino sees advantages to the continued US presence and would be reluctant to terminate the basing arrangements. We see little prospect for a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia soon, although Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members will continue to explore the possibility of a regional zone.

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**Importance of the Pacific Basin**

*Policymakers and military planners are concerned about regional antinuclear attitudes because the Pacific Basin has become increasingly important to the United States in both strategic and economic terms. Vital sea lanes through the region carry both raw materials and manufactured goods; commerce between the United States and Pacific Basin countries now exceeds that between the United States and Western Europe. The faster economic growth rate in this area is likely to widen this trade gap, making East Asia even more important in the future.*

*To protect its East Asian interests and balance growing Soviet military power in the Pacific, the United States maintains air, ground, and naval forces at large overseas bases*

*Treaties with Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand provide access to military facilities in those countries as well, and US naval ships frequently make port calls at Singapore, Hong Kong, and other East Asian ports. US forces*

*serve as a deterrent and provide a security umbrella for the United States, its allies, and other friendly East Asian countries.*

*Together the bases and ports serve as steppingstones across the Pacific and provide the logistic support necessary for the United States to react to crises and project military power to trouble spots throughout East Asia, the Pacific Basin, and the Indian Ocean. The US bases at Subic Bay and Clark in the Philippines serve as the hub of this network, linking bases in Hawaii, Japan, and Australia as well as the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Access to the overseas bases and joint facilities are critical elements in sustaining US military mobility and deployments in Asia. They*

*enable the monitoring of Soviet and other potentially hostile forces, and contribute to the combat effectiveness as well as interoperability among US and allied forces.*

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## Growth and Manipulation of Antinuclear Sentiment in East Asia: Consequences for US Forces

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### Introduction

East Asian political leaders, concerned about the continuing superpower arms race and nuclear proliferation, are actively debating measures to reduce the nuclear danger to their countries and the region. Politicians in South Pacific and Southeast Asian countries, for example, are considering the creation of regional nuclear-free zones as a way of responding to concerns over nuclear testing, nuclear waste disposal, the possibility of nuclear accidents, and the stationing of nuclear weapons in the region.<sup>1</sup> In addition to these multilateral arrangements, some politicians are advocating national policies that would prohibit or restrict the deployment or storage of nuclear weapons and ban visits by nuclear warships or overflights by aircraft carrying such weapons.

These antinuclear proposals have implications for US security interests in East Asia. The United States in the past has opposed the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific because it could constrain US naval operations in that region, and the United States also has resisted a nuclear-free zone for Southeast Asia because it could adversely affect US military activities and possibly transit through strategically important sea lanes in the region. Because of its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on its warships, the United States also opposes other countries' national policies that would limit US port calls to nonnuclear warships.

The Soviet Union has shown heightened interest in East Asia, and we believe it sees the antinuclear sentiment as an issue it can exploit to reduce US influence and military presence in the region. The Soviets support nuclear-free zones in East Asia as a way of demonstrating their peaceful intentions, while

sowing dissension among Western countries by fostering resentment against the United States for "forcing" nuclear weapons on its allies and friends.

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### Antinuclear Sentiment

Antinuclear sentiment in East Asia has its roots in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 and has been sustained by US nuclear testing in the South Pacific from the 1940s to the 1960s, by US and Japanese plans to dump nuclear wastes in the Pacific, by the continuing US-Soviet strategic arms race and proliferation of nuclear weapons, and by continuing French nuclear testing in Polynesia. Support for the antinuclear causes stems from concern over the potentially harmful effects of radiation caused by atomic tests or leaked from nuclear-powered warships. The growth of nuclear arsenals and the deployment of nuclear weapons in East Asia also have aroused fears of a nuclear exchange between the superpowers.

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### Antinuclear Hotspots

The current of antinuclear sentiment running through East Asia and the Pacific Basin has hotspots in New Zealand, Australia, the South Pacific, and Japan. The approval of a draft treaty for a nuclear-free zone by the South Pacific Forum last August, New Zealand's banning of nuclear-armed or -propelled warships from its ports, and the recent reversal of Japan's decision to dump nuclear wastes in the Pacific are the clearest manifestations of the growing sensitivity of political leaders to antinuclear attitudes.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The South Pacific Forum members include Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa.

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**Table 1**  
**New Zealand: Public Opinion**  
**Poll in March 1985 on**  
**Defense and Nuclear Issues**

	Yes	No	Other
Support ban on nuclear weapons entering New Zealand	52	41	7
Support ban on nuclear-powered warships visiting New Zealand ports	77	19	4
Believe United States treating New Zealand fairly after ban on US ship visit	38	53	9
Believe United States would aid New Zealand if it were attacked	69	17	14

**New Zealand**

Antinuclear forces are particularly strong in New Zealand, where sensitivities developed following US hydrogen bomb tests at Bikini Atoll in the 1950s. Three out of four parties participating in New Zealand's general election of July 1984 ran on platforms that included antinuclear planks—and won 60 percent of the vote. The Labor Party, with its strong antinuclear bias, was swept into power, and the popularity of its new Prime Minister, David Lange, surged after he refused in February 1985 to allow the nuclear-capable destroyer USS Buchanan to enter New Zealand ports. Lange and his Cabinet frequently cite election statistics, as well as public opinion polls, to claim that the Labor Party would lose the next election if it failed to write into law its policy of denying port access to warships believed to be carrying nuclear weapons.

**Nuclear Warship Ban.** We believe the present Labor government cannot be deterred from passing antinuclear legislation that, in its judgment, will be stiff enough to prevent any ship carrying nuclear weapons from entering New Zealand ports. Officials have hinted that New Zealand might allow nuclear-powered ships to visit, but US Embassy sources believe the government will not change the legislation to allow nuclear-powered ships that have received safety clearances to visit New Zealand. New Zealand will accept only small "nonnuclear" ships.

**The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone**

In August 1985, at the South Pacific Forum's annual conference, a majority of the 13 member nations approved a draft South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty that bans nuclear testing, waste dumping, and weapons stationing in the region but guarantees unimpeded transit of nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships on the high seas and allows individual countries to decide on the question of port access.

Australian Prime Minister Hawke took the lead in formulating the draft treaty to preempt more radical elements from barring nuclear-armed or -powered warships from all ports in the zone, to fulfill a campaign pledge, to quiet antinuclear elements in his Labor Party, to protect the joint defense facilities in Australia, and to maintain Australian leadership in the South Pacific against a more radical treaty.

The New Zealand Government joined Australia in promoting the treaty in its present form—against the wishes of the Labor Party left wing and other domestic antinuclear groups that believed the treaty should prohibit nuclear-armed and -powered ships throughout the region. The treaty forms a part of New Zealand's proposed antinuclear legislation, but that legislation is much more restrictive.

Several of the smaller island nations—Fiji, the Cook Islands, and Papua New Guinea—expressed reservations in August that the treaty might undercut regional security by restricting US and ANZUS activity in the region. Vanuatu, on the other hand, believes the treaty does not limit nuclear activities strictly enough. The treaty goes into effect when eight Forum members ratify it. To date four have ratified the treaty, and others are expected to do so later this year. A Forum delegation recently visited the nuclear powers—the USSR, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to elicit their support for the draft treaty and adherence to its protocols. The USSR and China have expressed agreement with the treaty.

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**Figure 1**  
**South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone**

— Limit of South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone  
 Fiji South Pacific Forum member



<sup>a</sup> Participation by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States subject to their accession to Protocol 1 of Treaty.

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

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
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Figure 2. USS Buchanan. [redacted]

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According to a longtime US Embassy contact, moreover, the impasse between the United States and New Zealand over port access is having a psychological effect on many Labor Party members that is harmful to US interests: many who have never before expressed anti-Americanism now see the United States as their opponent over the nuclear issue, and they may ultimately join longtime anti-West activists in supporting proposals that New Zealand withdraw from the Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty (ANZUS) and become nonaligned. [redacted]

**New Government?** On the basis of our analysis of public opinion polls and interviews with New Zealanders, we believe Lange correctly assesses the pervasive antinuclear sentiment of his countrymen. We are, however, less certain about his chances of reelection. A combination of disgruntlement with the economy and disaffection for Lange's policies over the longer term might unseat the Labor Party at the next election, which must be held by mid-1987. The Labor Party's popularity has dropped over the past year largely because of economic difficulties, while the opposition National Party has gained strength although it still trails Labor in public opinion surveys. National Party leaders are strong supporters of ANZUS and have stated that they would repeal pending New Zealand legislation banning nuclear ships. The outcome of the 1987 election is likely to hinge on the state of the economy at the time of the election. We believe the economy will begin to recover in mid-1987, but that may not be soon enough to ensure a Labor Party victory. [redacted]

#### **Australia**

Antinuclear sentiment is nearly as strong in neighboring Australia, but Australians are more conscious of their country as part of the world community and less open to isolationist solutions. Australia's ruling Labor Party took the lead—in part to fulfill an election promise but also to preclude more radical initiatives—in drafting the regional nuclear-free treaty that was approved by the South Pacific Forum last August. Australia welcomed the USS Buchanan, refused by New Zealand, and a sister ship to Sydney and Brisbane during March 1985, but antinuclear demonstrators have protested later visits by US warships. [redacted]

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We believe that antinuclearism is gaining strength in Australia. Reports of fewer participants at antinuclear rallies and protests in Australia against US ship visits are more than offset by the fact that more rallies and protests are being staged and more voters are supporting the single-issue antinuclear parties. According to the US Embassy in Canberra, the proportion of antinuclear voters is increasing, and a recent USIA survey shows that Australian voter support for US ship visits and Australian-US joint facilities is declining in comparison with earlier polls. [redacted]

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**Domestic Politics.** Labor Party moderates believe they must appear to respond to the demands of their left wing while maintaining Australia's defense alliance with the United States. They argue that qualified support for peace movements is a necessity for

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Figure 3. Marchers in New Zealand protesting US nuclear ship visit.

staying in office, not only because it keeps factions unified, but also because it prevents attrition to the single-issue antinuclear or peace parties. Labor Party support for the annual Palm Sunday Peace Marches, which draw hundreds of thousands, for instance, has become obligatory.

Foreign Minister Hayden is committed to arms control and disarmament talks and believes that the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty drafted by Australia is an important step toward halting the strategic arms race. When speaking with US officials, however, Hayden always phrases his concerns in terms of internal Labor politics—that is, unless party moderates can show the Australian public movement by the United States in arms control negotiations with the Soviets, they cannot hope to save the party from leftist control. Hayden is probably right. In our view many members of his own center-left faction would join the socialist-left faction in opposing cooperation with the United States if they lost faith in US arms control efforts. Leftists espouse restricting US aircraft and naval visits, closing the strategically important joint facilities, and adopting defense policies that would limit Australia's participation in ANZUS.

#### South Pacific Island States

Virtually all South Pacific island states have strong antinuclear constituencies, and nine of the 13 Forum members approved the draft treaty establishing a regional nuclear-free zone. Some of the small states




Figure 4. Australian "Disarmament Rally" notice.

oppose US naval visits while others would welcome them. Vanuatu has banned all nuclear ship visits, and Fiji, which is generally friendly toward the United States, temporarily banned US nuclear ships several years ago. Papua New Guinea and the Solomons have no clear policy, approving nuclear warship visits on a case-by-case basis. Kiribati is receptive to conventionally powered ships visits, but might balk at a port call by a nuclear-powered warship. Although the Cook Islands have ratified the treaty, Prime Minister Davis has criticized New Zealand's ship ban policy, claiming that it strips away the security provided by the ANZUS alliance.

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**Table 2**  
**Australia: Public Opinion Survey**  
**in December 1985 on**  
**Defense and Nuclear Issues <sup>a</sup>**

	Yes	No	Other
Support visits by nuclear-powered US warships to Australian ports	53 (55)	33 (30)	14 (15)
Believe benefits of joint Australian-US facilities outweigh added risks	57 (63)	29 (23)	14 (14)
Support United States over New Zealand in current ANZUS dispute	27 (35)	20 (22)	53 (43)

<sup>a</sup> The bracketed numbers show percentages from earlier polls.

Antinuclear activism is fueled by the University of the South Pacific in Fiji, where the influence of radical faculty members, including Australian and New Zealand expatriates, is very strong. The university has long supported antinuclear causes and last October used its annual Pacific Week Conference as a forum to criticize both the United States and France for their nuclear activities in the South Pacific, while defending the Soviet Union's purported peace and antinuclear record. Several speakers argued that it is the United States and not the Soviet Union that poses a threat to the South Pacific, and that there would be no danger of a Soviet attack on the region were it not for US facilities there.

Antinuclear sentiment in the South Pacific is directed primarily against the French because of their nuclear weapons tests in Polynesia, but the United States also gets its share of criticism for failing to condemn the French tests. Paris's announced plans to conduct atomic tests through the rest of this century; its disregard for regional environmental, economic, and foreign policy concerns; and France's involvement in the sinking of the Greenpeace protest vessel Rainbow Warrior in New Zealand last year have sharpened South Pacific objections to the French nuclear program specifically and to nuclear programs in general. South Pacific islanders argue that if nuclear tests are in fact harmless, France should conduct them at home.

**Japan**

Japanese nuclear sensitivity understandably arises from the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The Japanese have developed an ingrained antinuclear feeling, although popular support for antinuclear issues has waxed and waned over the past 40 years. Unlike the South Pacific islanders, the Japanese public tends to differentiate between nuclear weapons and nuclear power. Despite initial public resistance, Japan is now committed to an ambitious nuclear power program and has not been deterred by minor accidents at its nuclear plants.<sup>3</sup> As for nuclear weapons, the Japanese Government has always been careful to accommodate public sentiment by fine-tuning its nuclear policies and occasionally modifying its security arrangements with the United States:

- US plans to introduce nuclear-tipped Honest John tactical missiles into Japan in the mid-1950s led to a strong antinuclear reaction that forced the government to seek a compromise in which the missiles would be accepted, but only if they carried conventional warheads. The Japanese Government later revised the Mutual Security Treaty to require the United States to conduct "prior consultation" with Japan before making significant changes in the equipment of US forces in Japan—meaning introducing nuclear weapons.
- Port calls by nuclear-powered US warships beginning in 1964 helped rally support for antinuclear elements seeking to harness public opinion and gain political ground against the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. This led the conservative government of Prime Minister Sato to adopt in 1967 its so-called three nonnuclear principles—that Japan will neither manufacture, possess, nor permit the entry of nuclear weapons.

<sup>3</sup> During the past 20 years, the Japanese have experienced numerous accidents at their nuclear plants. The latest occurred in June 1986, when an American and Japanese inspection team was exposed to low-level radiation at the Tokaimura nuclear research center northeast of Tokyo. Tokaimura has had many radiation leaks, but they have attracted little public attention.

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**Table 3**  
**Japan: Public Attitudes in**  
**November 1984 on**  
**Nuclear Issues**

	Yes	No	Other
Support US warship visits and possible entry of nuclear weapons	37	47	16
Believe Japanese Government abiding by policy prohibiting entry of nuclear weapons	22	65	13
Believe United States adheres to Japan's nuclear principles	19	65	16

• Former Ambassador Reischauer's statement in a 1981 press interview that US warships armed with nuclear weapons had transited Japanese ports for decades with Tokyo's knowledge and tacit approval unleashed a political storm in Japan.<sup>4</sup> Then Prime Minister Suzuki denied Reischauer's charges and asserted that "introduction" unquestionably included not only the stationing of US nuclear weapons on Japanese territory but also base visits by US warships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, which would require prior consultations. Suzuki said that his government would reject any US request for a nuclear-armed warship to enter a Japanese port—even in an emergency—and claimed that the US and Japanese Governments had no differences in interpretation of these points.

**Current Attitudes.** We believe antinuclear sentiment in Japan is waning as reflected by changes in public opinion polls, the dwindling size of demonstrations that occur when US naval ships visit Japanese ports, the tone of ceremonies surrounding the 40th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the discrediting of the peace movement because of the

<sup>4</sup> US forces are granted the use of bases in Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement. To allay public concern that the United States might bring nuclear weapons into Japan, Tokyo insisted that the 1960 treaty revision incorporate an exchange of notes committing Washington to consult with Tokyo before introducing nuclear weapons. Neither government spelled out whether "introduction" referred to transit of US warships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons or only to stationing of US nuclear weapons in Japan.

continuing battle between the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) for control of Japanese antinuclear organizations. 25X1

**Socialists and Communists.** Opposition parties and their ancillary organizations, such as leftwing labor unions, are the primary organizations incorporating in their platforms antinuclear policies that can be used to attack the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and increase their own political power. The JCP has tried to revive its flagging grassroots support through local protests against US deployment of Tomahawk cruise missiles, but has failed to kindle popular interest in this issue. Anti-Tomahawk protests staged outside the Yokosuka and Sasebo naval bases each time a US naval ship or submarine carrying Tomahawks arrives have turned out few demonstrators and the marches have been peaceful. 25X1

The JSP has remained staunchly antinuclear and has long supported a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific. The Socialists want a neutral Japan, lack confidence in mutual nuclear deterrence, and claim that Japan's defense alliance with the United States could result in a Soviet preemptive strike. Disagreements between the party's right and left wings have, however, hindered the JSP's ability to press antinuclear issues at home, and the Socialists have fared no better internationally. A visit by JSP Chairman Ishibashi to New Zealand and Australia earlier this year to solidify policies only resulted in highlighting differences between the Japanese Socialists and their New Zealand and Australian counterparts. 25X1

**Port-Call Issue.** Faced with criticism in 1984 over the scheduled deployment of nuclear-capable Tomahawk cruise missiles to US 7th Fleet ships home ported in Japan, the Japanese Government argued that the ability to carry nuclear weapons and the question of whether nuclear weapons were actually on board were entirely different matters. Tokyo held it could not reject a port call simply because a ship had the capability of carrying nuclear weapons, as long as Washington had not requested prior consultations. 25X1

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Japan's port-call policies were debated anew last year as a result of New Zealand's nonnuclear policy and its refusal to permit a US warship to make a port call. To keep their antinuclear platforms before the public, both the JCP and the JSP suggested that Japan follow New Zealand's lead. In an effort in mid-February 1985 to provoke the government to respond in the Diet, a JSP spokesman asked whether Japan could legally initiate prior consultations under the Security Treaty or perhaps use its own data to determine whether US ships visiting Japanese ports were carrying nuclear weapons. [ ]

Tokyo responded by having Foreign Minister Abe and other senior officials reiterate the government's position. They asserted that, in contrast to the ANZUS pact, the Mutual Security Treaty obligates Washington to seek prior consultation with Tokyo if nuclear weapons are introduced into Japan. Moreover, the treaty requires Japan to permit US ships to visit Japanese ports, and Japan cannot reject such ship visits unless they become a subject of prior consultations. Finally, because Washington has not requested prior consultation and the security relationship is based on trust, Tokyo assumes the United States has not violated its obligation. [ ]

**Hiroshima and Nagasaki.** The relatively low-key 40th anniversary observances in August 1985 of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki indicate these historically important events have lost much of their significance as rallying points for antinuclear activities. Although the ceremonies received considerable attention from international media, they failed to stir emotions in Japan. The moderate tone of the Hiroshima ceremony, the decision of major antinuclear groups to exclude disruptive elements, and the fact that local Japanese media attention ceased when the ceremonies moved to Nagasaki indicate the decline in importance of these events. [ ]

#### Potential Problem Areas

Antinuclear feeling is not nearly so intense or widespread elsewhere in East Asia, but it is becoming a politically important issue in China, Hong Kong, the Koreans, and Southeast Asia and could affect US




Figure 5. Some of the marchers who took part in the antinuclear ceremonies at Nagasaki, Japan, on 9 August 1985. [ ]

military operations. For example, in Southeast Asia, where US air and naval bases in the Philippines sit astride critically important sea lanes passing through narrow chokepoints, nuclear issues are beginning to receive greater attention, with several member countries of ASEAN expressing renewed interest in forming their own nuclear-free zone. A nuclear-free zone here accompanied by restrictive policies similar to those of New Zealand would severely limit US capabilities in both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. [ ]

#### Southeast Asia

**The Philippines.** There is little public expression of antinuclear sentiment in the Philippines, and antinuclear issues are not a pressing problem for the Aquino government. The Communist Party of the

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Philippines, however, apparently sees the antinuclear issue as exploitable. In 1985 the Communists organized a march and demonstration against the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant that attracted about 20,000 marchers and halted traffic and business activity in Bataan for several days. The Communists have long advocated the removal of the US military presence from the Philippines and may now be focusing attention on banning US nuclear warships and weapons. The Communists probably had a hand in organizing the antinuclear demonstration on 30 June 1986 by 400 protestors outside the Subic Bay naval base. The marchers, who included disgruntled shipyard workers, demanded the removal of US bases, nuclear weapons, and nuclear warships, claiming that they make the Philippines a target for nuclear attack. [ ]

President Aquino has not championed antinuclear causes and evidently is committed to retaining US bases. [ ]

[ ] In her meeting with New Zealand Prime Minister Lange, Aquino refused to take a position on the nuclear ship ban issue, stressing instead the longstanding close ties between the Philippines and the United States. [ ]

Several of Aquino's leftist advisers, however, have been urging her to take a stronger stand on antinuclear issues. The Aquino government has been considering halting construction at Bataan because of economic as well as safety reasons, and press reporting indicates it has now decided not to proceed with the plant in view of the disaster at Chernobyl'. If the Communists succeed in generating increased public enthusiasm for barring nuclear power and nuclear weapons from the Philippines, leftist pressure on Aquino to adopt antinuclear platforms probably will increase. Negotiations over US basing rights in the Philippines could be especially difficult if the Philippine Government chooses to address the question of weapons storage at Clark Air Base and Subic Bay. [ ]

**Indonesia.** Indonesian leaders have positioned themselves to champion nuclear and disarmament issues in both regional and international—especially Third World—forums. President Soeharto frequently stresses superpower disarmament and nuclear arms control issues in his speeches, and Foreign Minister Mochtar has long sought international support for Indonesia's proposed nuclear-weapons-free zone. [ ]

[ ] Mochtar is heartened by the South Pacific antinuclear treaty and may redouble his efforts to promote an ASEAN version. [ ]

Indonesian leaders recognize, however, that they will have to build a greater consensus both domestically and within ASEAN before they can make substantial gains toward their antinuclear goals. Senior Indonesian military officers, for example, oppose the nuclear-free-zone concept, and authorities in other ASEAN capitals are similarly skeptical. Indonesian diplomats and defense officials concede that a regional nuclear-weapons-free zone in Southeast Asia is a long-term objective that would have to accommodate Thai and Philippine defense ties to the United States and could not unilaterally restrict passage of nuclear warships. [ ]

**Malaysia.** Malaysia in 1971 proposed a "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality" (ZOPFAN) for Southeast Asia and has continued to support antiwar and antinuclear issues as a matter of policy. There is no organized antinuclear movement in Malaysia, but Malaysian officials continue to talk about establishing a regional nuclear-free zone. [ ]

[ ] the Malaysians see the South Pacific treaty as a model that could be used to make Southeast Asia a nuclear-free zone. [ ]

#### **China**

China, too, is becoming sensitive to nuclear issues but has adopted policies on nuclear-free zones and nuclear warship visits that appear to be deliberately ambiguous. To burnish its international image, Beijing recently announced that it would stop atmospheric

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testing of nuclear devices. Chinese officials have taken contradictory positions in public and in private on the nuclear-free-zone issue—the Chinese seem to be pursuing the conflicting goals of enhancing their status with nonaligned states while reassuring the United States that China wants good relations. [ ]

[ ] the contradictions also reflect differences within the leadership over policy. [ ]

The Chinese have publicly supported the South Pacific nuclear-free zone. Privately, however, Chinese reservations about provisions in the treaty that ban nuclear testing and call for nonproliferation were conveyed by Foreign Ministry official Li Changhe to the South Pacific Forum delegation that visited Beijing in January 1986. China tested an unarmed intercontinental-range ballistic missile in the South Pacific in 1980, and China sympathizes with France's desire to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent, which involves continuing nuclear testing in the South Pacific. [ ]

**Ship Visit Policy.** Chinese media and officials have publicly expressed support for New Zealand's ban on port calls by nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed warships. Since Wellington's action, Beijing has adopted a similar policy, which led to the refusal to allow French warships to visit Qingdao in January 1986. During his recent visit to Australia, Vice Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen emphasized that China had arrived at its policy independently and New Zealand's action had not been a factor. [ ]

To assuage the United States, however, other Chinese officials privately have expressed regrets over the cancellation of the US port call. Even Vice Foreign Minister Zhu has indicated that China hoped the United States could resolve its problems within ANZUS because the Chinese believe only the Soviet Union stands to benefit from differences between the United States and its allies. They fear the United States may be forced to reduce its naval forces in the region, weakening US ability to counter the Soviet naval buildup in the Pacific. [ ]

The Chinese seek Western military technology to modernize their forces and they recognize that access depends on fostering good bilateral ties to the United

States. In meetings with US officials, Chinese military officers have expressed concern that Beijing's decision to demand assurances that visiting US ships not be nuclear armed could prompt the United States to restrict China's access to US military technology.

The fact that the Chinese recently allowed a British naval ship visit indicates that a US naval port call is not a dead issue. We believe the Chinese military may press for renewed negotiations on a US ship visit and will argue for arrangements comparable to those used with the British. [ ]

### **Hong Kong**

Antinuclear activities could become a problem in Hong Kong. The antinuclear movement in Hong Kong, aroused by the Chernobyl' disaster, has intensified its opposition to China's construction of the Daya Bay nuclear power plant 50 kilometers north of the territory. Antinuclear demonstrators claim to have collected 700,000 signatures opposing the project.

Beijing's cautious reaction to the protestors shows its increased skill in handling local issues and an improved understanding of how it must act to maintain stability and confidence in Hong Kong. [ ]

[ ] China asked its supporters in the colony to reassure Hong Kong residents of the plant's safety; Beijing acknowledged that public assurances from Chinese officials might cause an adverse reaction. The United Kingdom will attempt to squelch the protests because it is providing the plant's turbines. [ ]

There also is opposition in Hong Kong to nuclear weapons. Pacifists argue that Hong Kong could become a nuclear target in a conflict involving the Soviet Union, the United States, China, and the United Kingdom, and they recommend working for disarmament and a nuclear-free world while opposing nuclear warship visits because such visits make Hong Kong a potential target. We can envision few circumstances in which British authorities would stop US port calls, but, with Hong Kong reverting to Chinese control in 1997, the question of ship visits could become part of the larger Chinese sovereignty issue.

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We would expect Hong Kong's policy to be consistent with the mainland's and therefore probably more restrictive of future US naval visits. [ ]

#### Korea

There has been little antinuclear activity on the Korean Peninsula, but South Korean students protesting against the Chun government are increasingly carrying placards that call for removing nuclear weapons from the South and making the country a nuclear-free zone. In our judgment, most South Koreans are more concerned about the North Korean military threat and believe that US forces based in South Korea are needed to deter the North. [ ]

The North Koreans, however, try to use the issue to foment domestic opposition in the South and pressure the United States to reduce its arsenal. North Korea has long made an issue of US nuclear weapons in South Korea, portraying the US presence as a danger to the people of the South. The North routinely argues that the effects of a nuclear war cannot be confined to north of the 38th parallel, while intimating that the use of nuclear weapons based in South Korea would invite a retaliatory nuclear strike. It demands the withdrawal of these weapons and has for many years called for the Korean Peninsula to be made a nuclear-free zone. The North Korean propaganda appears to have hit a responsive chord with radical students in the South. According to the US Embassy in Seoul, student extremists are using anti-US and antinuclear themes that bear a close resemblance to North Korean propaganda. [ ]

**P'yongyang-Moscow Ties.** In the past year or so, the nuclear question has also provided a convenient means for P'yongyang both to strengthen its ties to Moscow and to signal its broader foreign policy realignment toward the Soviet Union. North Korea has publicly supported Soviet nuclear disarmament proposals. Following the US-Soviet Geneva summit last year, P'yongyang suggested that US policy on Korea would be one indication of Washington's intentions to follow through on principles agreed on at the summit. North Korea even hinted that future US-Soviet summit talks

might directly discuss the Korean issue. Moscow, in turn, has noted that the North Korean approach is complementary to its own. In a joint communique issued after Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to P'yongyang in January 1986 and in a TASS statement in early February, the Soviet Union asserted that implementation of North Korean proposals for the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons and troops from Korea and for turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone would be in the spirit of the accords reached in Geneva last year. [ ]

**Political Trade-Off.** We believe P'yongyang has used its support for Soviet nuclear initiatives to attract help from Moscow for its nuclear power industry. The Soviets have agreed to provide at least one nuclear power plant. But North Korea has had to pay a price for this support—last December it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at Moscow's behest. P'yongyang's reluctance to accede to the NPT is evidenced by its failure to acknowledge this development publicly. Its decision to do so reflects its increasing dependence on Soviet economic and military support, providing Moscow with a public relations windfall of having convinced a recalcitrant Asian power to join the nonproliferation regime. [ ]

#### Soviet Manipulation of Antinuclear Issues

Moscow is working hard to fan antinuclear sentiment in East Asia in order to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies. The Soviets are employing propaganda and traditional means of influence peddling, such as giving favorable media treatment to regional calls for nuclear-free zones and cultivating local labor unions through the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). In addition, the Soviets, under General Secretary Gorbachev, have attached greater importance to projecting a more favorable image in the region. [ ]

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**Secret****Soviet Policy in East Asia**

Gorbachev launched his new diplomatic offensive last May when he called for the convening of an all-Asian security forum.<sup>5</sup> In this he is pursuing two objectives: obtaining recognition of the USSR as a major political player as well as a military power in East Asia, and limiting the influence of the United States.<sup>6</sup> Topics suggested for discussion at the forum include major themes the Soviets are promoting in their antinuclear campaign:

- Withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula.
- Reduction of US naval activity in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
- Establishment of a zone of peace in Southeast Asia.
- Establishment of a South Pacific nuclear-free zone.
- Fuller exploitation of antiwar and antinuclear sentiment. [ ]

Vietnam and Laos have dutifully promoted Gorbachev's security proposal, but non-Communist countries have given it a lukewarm response. Nonetheless, the Soviets have reason to be encouraged by the growing antinuclear movement in New Zealand, Australia, and the South Pacific. Moscow is in an especially good position to capitalize on pacifist sentiments because of its longstanding support of leftists and Communists in the New Zealand and Australian labor unions. Soviet efforts are also helped by the fact that the Soviet military buildup and modernization have not extended to the South Pacific. Consequently, many South Pacific islanders do not view the Soviets as militarily threatening. [ ]

**Australia-New Zealand**

The Soviets are carefully nurturing antinuclear sentiment in Australia and New Zealand through propaganda, all-expenses-paid trips to the Soviet Union for trade union members, and sponsorship of antinuclear

<sup>5</sup> Gorbachev's proposal is the fifth in a series of similar Soviet-sponsored initiatives going back to Brezhnev's call in 1969 for the "creation of a system of collective security in Asia." [ ]

seminars and conferences by their front groups. According to Embassy reporting, the Soviets work primarily through indigenous Communist groups. Although total party membership in Australia and New Zealand is small, the Communists have considerable clout in the trade unions, and with Moscow's assistance have been active in promoting causes that parallel Soviet lines. The Soviets have longstanding ties to well-placed political radicals who can substantially affect labor's nuclear policy. [ ]

**Front Connections.** The Soviets use their Communist contacts to arrange for Australian and New Zealand socialists to travel to the USSR. Embassy reporting indicates Moscow has been especially successful in using this technique to cultivate high-level members of New Zealand's Federation of Labor, including Secretary-Treasurer Kenneth Douglas, Vice President Sonja Davies, and President James Knox. Although professing to be anti-Communist, Knox has long been affiliated with the WFTU and, over the past year, he has worked hard to promote Soviet positions on nuclear issues. [ ]

Another Soviet front group—the World Peace Council—tries to promote antinuclear sentiment in Australia. Last October it sponsored the International Peace Conference for the Pacific and Asia Region in Sydney. The conference represented a well-orchestrated attack on US foreign and defense policies. Several speakers alleged that the US nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not necessary because Japan was already on the verge of surrendering and US intelligence knew it. These forums allow Moscow to promote political initiatives such as antinuclear and anti-American concerns while providing Soviet front leaders an opportunity to travel to the area. [ ]

**The South Pacific**

The Soviets have limited access to the South Pacific island states but are stepping up their efforts to establish a political as well as a commercial presence in the region. Changing circumstances, especially

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economic problems in the region, have provided Moscow with a better chance for expanded influence than at any other time since the island states gained independence in the mid-1970s. The Soviets have a fishing agreement with Kiribati, and recent Embassy reporting suggests there is a good chance that current talks will result in similar Soviet agreements with Vanuatu, Tuvalu, and Fiji. South Pacific islanders, in need of economic assistance and piqued over US tuna fishing practices, are more receptive to Soviet offers for fishing agreements. [ ]

The controversy over New Zealand's port call decision and its continuing disagreement with the United States over ANZUS obligations have provided Moscow an incentive to encourage the growth of local antinuclear sentiment in the South Pacific. The Soviets repeatedly have provided both diplomatic and media support for the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone and have indicated that they will formally endorse the treaty. In early February, a South Pacific Forum delegation visited Moscow to explain the draft treaty approved in August 1985 and to seek Soviet adherence to its protocols. According to reporting from the US Embassy in Moscow, Soviet officials expressed concern that individual states were allowed to make their own decisions about port access of ships, nuclear or not. Moscow's objective is to persuade all the Pacific island states to adopt the much tougher position of the Lange government on banning port calls. [ ]

### Japan

Moscow sees Japan as the cornerstone of US strategic policy in Asia and is especially eager to disrupt the US-Japanese security relationship, which has grown stronger in recent years, largely in response to the Soviet military buildup in the Far East. In its leadership statements and media reporting, Moscow has attempted to focus the attention of Japanese antinuclear groups on the presence of US military bases in Japan and US naval operations in the Pacific. Soviet propaganda frequently notes the arrival of US nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable warships at Japanese ports and urges the Japanese to enforce their existing antinuclear principles and deny them access. [ ]



**Figure 6.** Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Abe in Japan. [ ]

Under Gorbachev, the Soviets are not only continuing their efforts to develop closer links to antinuclear advocates in Japan, but are also trying to project a better image in Asia and Japan in particular. Gorbachev is attempting a conciliatory style of diplomacy toward Japan in hopes of both reinforcing the neutralist tendencies in Japanese public opinion and appealing to the Japanese sense of independence. [ ]

**Shevardnadze's Visit.** The most important demonstration of the "new style" in Soviet policy toward Japan was Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's four-day visit in January 1986, the first in a decade by a Soviet foreign minister. The visit gave Shevardnadze the opportunity to ask the Japanese not to participate in the US strategic defense initiative, criticize the presence of US military forces in East Asia, and urge support for Gorbachev's proposal for eliminating nuclear weapons. Embassy reporting from Tokyo indicates that the Japanese turned aside these requests but viewed Shevardnadze's sophisticated approach as a relief from the heavyhanded tactics that characterized Gromyko's policies toward Japan. [ ]

**Influence Peddling.** The Soviets are trying to improve their ties to leftist opposition parties, organized labor, and peace groups to broaden their access to the

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disarmament movement in Japan. The Soviets have paid particular attention to the JCP and JSP, which are actively involved in organizing antinuclear rallies.<sup>7</sup> Moscow has encouraged these activities, and in a move to enhance relations hosted representatives from each of the rival parties at its recent party congress in Moscow. JCP and JSP leaders alike applauded Soviet disarmament initiatives, but both parties have been careful to emphasize areas of disagreement. The two parties, competing for leadership of the Japanese left, have moderated their rhetoric in recent years and have not hesitated to deviate from Moscow to maintain their Japanese identity. [ ]

The Soviets have developed contacts with representatives of the General Council of Trade Unions—Japan's largest and most militant union—and have tried to influence the smaller, more moderate Japanese Confederation of Labor by establishing contacts with its leaders and promoting Soviet antinuclear policies. Moscow has had little success in establishing the WFTU in Japan because Japanese leftists and unionists are wary of being "used" by the Soviets. [ ]

### **Southeast Asia**

The Soviets are also actively supporting antinuclear activities in Southeast Asia. Moscow has long supported Malaysia's proposal for a Southeast Asian "zone of peace" and has stepped up its diplomatic and media support for a nuclear-free zone in the region. But Moscow has had trouble convincing ASEAN of its peaceful intentions. The cornerstone of Moscow's policy toward the region is its alliance with Vietnam, and this has led to a steady expansion of Soviet military presence in Indochina, upsetting ASEAN leaders and increasing their suspicion of Soviet intentions. [ ]

**Propaganda.** The Soviets are using their propaganda apparatus to encourage domestic support for antinuclear issues in Southeast Asia. According to the US Embassy in Bangkok, immediately after Gorbachev's

proposal in January 1986 to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000, the Soviet Embassy began issuing news bulletins lauding the nuclear-weapons-free zone concept for Southeast Asia. The bulletins quoted Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa as welcoming the ASEAN states' intention to make the region nuclear free, and they applauded the progress of the South Pacific states in fashioning a nuclear-free zone while stressing the importance of banning ships carrying nuclear weapons. [ ]

**Labor Ties.** The Soviets have had difficulty establishing links to labor unions in the ASEAN countries, and this has denied them one of their primary means of promoting antinuclear sentiment. According to Embassy reporting, Moscow has made no headway in influencing leftists in Indonesia, Malaysia, or Singapore, where the governments maintain tight control over labor movements. Moscow's only success in cultivating labor movements in the region is in the Philippines. WFTU officials travel frequently to Manila to meet with labor leaders and Communist officials and are currently attempting to lay the groundwork for a WFTU-sponsored conference there. [ ]

Moscow is using other front organizations to play upon antinuclear sentiment. In late 1985 the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council cosponsored a peace conference at the prestigious University of the Philippines. The conference, the first of its kind in the Philippines, warned against the dangers of nuclear war in Asia. Embassy reporting indicates the Soviets are actively trying to cultivate newspaper correspondents, leftist intellectuals, and academics, who are all in positions to influence Philippine public opinion and are possibly willing to fan dissatisfaction with the US military presence in the Philippines. We see little prospect of Soviet success because most Filipinos favor keeping the US bases. [ ]

The Soviets face obstacles in generating antibase and antinuclear sentiment in the Philippines. The vast majority of Filipinos are favorably disposed to the United States, especially since US support was instrumental in a peaceful transition of power from Marcos to Aquino. Moscow, nevertheless, probably has reason

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to consider the Philippines its most promising target among the non-Communist Southeast Asian nations. With US bases present, the stakes are the highest and it is the most vulnerable ASEAN country politically and economically. Despite the current widespread popularity of Aquino, she is an untested leader facing enormous problems. We expect Moscow to look for opportunities that it can exploit in seeking the removal of US military bases. [ ]

### Soviet Dilemma

In Australia and New Zealand, as well as in much of the South Pacific, the Soviets are not perceived as a direct military threat, and Moscow has been able to cultivate leftists who are actively promoting anti-nuclear sentiment in their own countries and in the neighboring region. We believe the Soviets will achieve some success in influencing antinuclear attitudes in this region. [ ]

In our judgment the Soviets will be less successful in the other areas of East Asia, where they are considered a military threat. Prime Minister Nakasone could have been speaking for the rest of East Asia when he told the Soviets last year that no Asian country was prepared to consider an Asian security conference seriously as long as Soviet military forces posed a threat.<sup>8</sup> This response sums up the dilemma that hinders the Soviets' efforts to promote their antinuclear campaign in East Asia, namely that the Soviets attach a higher priority to military modernization in the Far East. [ ]

Despite Gorbachev's "smile offensive" vis-a-vis Tokyo, Soviet media play on antinuclear and anti-US themes, cultivation of the leftist parties and labor unions, and other influence peddling measures, the Soviets have had trouble capitalizing on the strong neutralist and antinuclear sentiment in Japan. The problem for the Soviets is simply that their political objective is subordinate to the military objective of

<sup>8</sup> The Soviet buildup of SS-20s, their growing military power in the Far East and naval power in the Pacific, their invasion of Afghanistan, and their growing presence at Cam Ranh Bay and support of Vietnamese operations in Cambodia undermine Moscow's efforts to portray a benign image to East Asia. [ ]

increasing their military power in the Far East, including the militarization of the Northern Territories claimed by Japan.<sup>9</sup> Moscow is unlikely to make concessions on the disputed islands because that could weaken its military position. [ ]

### Outlook

We believe antinuclear feeling will remain strong, especially in the South Pacific. We expect the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty to be formally adopted later this year and believe that other Asian countries, including nuclear weapons states China and the Soviet Union, will support the treaty and agree to its protocols. We also expect the antinuclear policies of the Lange government in New Zealand to culminate in legislation that prohibits port calls by nuclear-powered or nuclear-capable warships. [ ]

In our judgment at least a few of the small South Pacific island states will follow New Zealand's lead and restrict the transit and port access of nuclear warships. Island states favorably inclined toward the United States and ANZUS will be reluctant to ban port calls because it would hurt ANZUS. On the other hand, the antinuclear issue is one of the few that the small states can use to challenge US policies, and several may use port access to register unhappiness with the United States or as leverage for obtaining economic assistance. [ ]

The leaders of Australia's ruling Labor Party are committed to supporting ANZUS and Australia's role in that alliance. Therefore, despite the party's vocal antinuclear element, we believe the government will be able to hold the line on US ship visits and use of strategically important joint facilities over the next year or two. We are less sanguine for the longer term, however. Our analysis of public opinion polls shows that antinuclear sentiments are spreading and that a

<sup>9</sup> The Northern Territories are the four small Japanese islands near Hokkaido that were seized by Soviet troops at the end of World War II and on which the Soviets have been deploying troops since 1978. [ ]

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clear majority of voters under age 30 hold antinuclear and antialliance views.<sup>10</sup> These voters constitute a growing percentage of the electorate. If antinuclear elements were to become the majority within the Labor Party, they would be able to force party leaders to restrict ship visits and close joint facilities. [ ]

In Japan, we see little likelihood that the antinuclear opposition parties would achieve the consensus to force the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to change its policies and restrict US military access to Japanese bases or ports. Moreover, we believe the Japanese are firmly committed to the Mutual Security Treaty and see the advantage of helping the United States maintain a strong defensive posture in the western Pacific opposite the Soviet Union. Barring a major shift in Soviet military posture in the Far East or a major nuclear accident in or very near Japan, we doubt the Japanese will change their policies. [ ]

In North Korea, we expect P'yongyang to continue its antinuclear propaganda condemning the United States for deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea and urging southerners to demand their removal. The North Korean propaganda appears to be encouraging some radical students to demonstrate against nuclear weapons and the US military presence in South Korea. According to the US Embassy in Seoul, radical students are carrying placards and banners with slogans that are similar to North Korean propaganda themes. Opposition leaders have condemned the student extremists, and we doubt that P'yongyang's efforts will affect large segments of the public. [ ]

Although the Chinese have recently allowed UK ships to visit and continue to discuss with US officials the possibility of a US port call, we believe Chinese sensitivity to nuclear issues will continue to restrict access by US and allied nuclear warships to Chinese ports. In neighboring Hong Kong, the nascent antinuclear movement poses little immediate threat to US port calls. Hong Kong's ship-visit policy is, however,

likely to be more restrictive after 1997, when the Chinese take over and assume responsibility for Hong Kong's defense and foreign policy. [ ]

In Southeast Asia, the antinuclear movement poses little or no threat to US basing rights in the Philippines, but President Aquino has said she will hold a popular referendum on the US-Philippine agreement before it expires in 1991. This could result in a public airing of nuclear warship basing and weapons storage at both Subic Bay and Clark. We believe Aquino sees economic as well as geopolitical advantages to the continued US presence and she would be reluctant to terminate the basing arrangements. [ ]

We see little prospect for a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia any time soon, although members of ASEAN will doubtless explore the possibility of a regional zone. We believe ASEAN concerns about the Soviet air and naval presence at Cam Ranh Bay as well as Soviet support of Vietnamese operations in Cambodia will preclude any action by ASEAN that could hamstring US military capabilities. [ ]

### Consequences for US Forces

#### Most Likely Scenario

Because of the pervasiveness of the antinuclear movement in the South Pacific, we believe that the countries in that area are more likely than others in East Asia to restrict access to bases and ports and otherwise impose policies that could damage US security interests. Aside from the nettlesome problem with New Zealand over port calls and its role in ANZUS, we see relatively little impact on US military capabilities as a result of the regional nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, provided transit remains unimpeded. The key to US mobility in the region is Australia. As long as Australia holds the line on ship and aircraft visits, US forces will be able to operate effectively in the southwestern Pacific. [ ]

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**Secret****Alternative Scenario**

A far more damaging scenario would result if Australia restricted US access to its bases, ports, and joint facilities. That could happen if antinuclear factions of the Labor Party gained power. Moreover, the Australians would probably restrict access only as part of a broader defense policy shift that would result in [REDACTED]

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Australia's leaving ANZUS. Australia is a critical link in the US defense posture in the South Pacific and Indian Oceans, and such actions on its part would severely damage US capabilities in both regions.

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